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Share Valuation- A Chance for Financial
Literacy
WARREN E. BANKS*
CHARLES N. CARNES**
INTRODUCTION
Sovereign attitudes about the exact amount of protection to be
accorded the rights and expectations of individual shareholders in
a corporation have changed over the decades, yet are still in a
state of flux. Early in the corporate era, traditional individualistic
notions about the immutability of contract rights and the con-
tinuity of property rights governed official attitudes about share
ownership. This approach soon proved to be too rigid to serve le-
gitimate corporate institutional purposes. Individualistic rights
therefore began to give way to institutional rights to facilitate cor-
porate exploitation of business opportunities and to achieve finan-
cial advantages.1
Corporate charter amendments have long been allowed which
add to or change the original corporate purposes or alter and
restructure the existing power and economic relationships among
the shareholders.2 Various notice, procedural and voting mecha-
nisms were devised to accomplish these fundamental changes and
at the same time to protect the interests of the individual share-
holders. Ultimately, the courts had to identify the outer limits of
the propriety of these maneuvers. The concept of "vested rights"
served to do this initially' as did restrictive statutory interpreta-
tion. In the states attracting businesses wishing to incorporate,
* Distinguished Professor of Finance, Chairholder, Harold A. Dulan Finance Chair in
Capital Formation, University of Arkansas, B.S., 1950; J.D., 1953: M.B.A., 1960; Ph.D.,
1968; University of Arkansas.
** Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. B.A., University of Louisville, 1953;
LL.B., University of Kentucky, 1953; LL.M., Yale University, 1954.
1. See Lattin, Minority & Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental
Changes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 307, 308-10 (1958). See also Gibson, How Fixed
Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (1958); Weiss, Balanc-
Ing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (1983).
2. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 291-92.
3. See Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 624, 627-31 (1981).
4. Bowman v. Armour & Co., 17 Il. 2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 753 (1959) (holding that
1
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SHARE VALUATION
the scales were increasingly balanced in favor of corporate need
and institutional flexibility. More recently, complete and perma-
nent separation of shareholders from their corporation against
their desires has been allowed.5
While the individual shareholders no longer can depend on the
form and permanency of their relationship to their corporation, it
is recognized that in a squeeze-out, the ousted shareholders must
be properly compensated for the interests which they are being
forced to surrender. Several decades ago, the Delaware court
adopted a set of influential guidelines, called "the Delaware block
rule," for valuing these shares. Originally, the rule was applied to
merger situations in which the departing shareholders accepted
the appraised value of their shares rather than receive an interest
in the merged (and changed) corporation.7 More recently, the
block rule has been extended in Delaware to coercive situations in
which minority departure was not a matter of choice. The recent
case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,8 prompted the Delaware court to
rethink its share appraisal rules.
I. PAST VALUATION METHODS
In the past, the court in applying the block rule for appraising
shares generally relied on a weighted average of several value fac-
tors which it recognized as elements of value inherent in the
shares. Usually recognized were "earnings" and "net assets," and
less frequently, "market price" and dividends." 9
As used in the accounting sense, asset book value often served
as a starting point for valuing assets of the corporation. However,
the courts did not use that figure alone to determine asset book
value.10 Delaware courts took a broader view of asset value than
did accountants and considered it only an integral part of the go-
the Illinois corporation statute did not permit a recapitalization by charter amendment
which converted preferred stock to debt securities).
5. See Weiss, supra note 3, at 632-57; Gibson, supra note 1, at 286.
6. See, e.g., In Re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6
(1947).
7. See Weiss, supra note 1, at 12-25.
8. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) [hereinafter UOP]. The Court of Chancery report
appears at 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) [hereinafter Weinberger].
9. See In re Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75
A.2d 244 (1950); Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 101, 66 A.2d 910 (1949),
rev'd 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (1950); General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch.
480, 52 A.2d 6 (1947). See also a list of selected block rule cases in V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE-CASES AND MATERIALS 579-80 (2d ed. 1979); Banks,
A Selective Inquiry into Judicial Stock Valuation, 6 IND. L. REV. 19 (1972); Banks, Mea-
suring the Value of Corporate Stock, 1I CAL. W.L. REV. 1 (1974).
10. See Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1966).
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ing concern's value of which the minority shareholder was being
deprived. For example, contrary to generally accepted accounting
principles, one court permitted the addition of a subjectively de-
termined amount of "goodwill" to the assets."' In another, a court
allowed a reduction for the obsolescence of a balance sheet item
but declined to allow additions for construction in progress and
leasehold improvements.' 2 In yet another, a court permitted a
write-up of all the assets to their estimated replacement values
less depreciation.' 3
Delaware courts thus showed little concern for assets as mea-
sured by the accountant and no reluctance to make adjustments in
the figures especially if these alterations corrected an apparent un-
derstatement traceable to generally accepted accounting principles
or if they occurred due to the unique nature of the business. Fur-
thermore, these courts seem to have favored replacement value
rather than liquidation value.14
Delaware courts also refused to view corporate assets as having
value only because of the income they can be expected to pro-
duce.15 Rather, they insisted on considering the assets and corpo-
rate earnings as separate components of the worth of a going con-
cern. Consideration of two (or more) value elements poses the
problem of how to combine them into a single value figure. To
reach such a figure, a weighted average of the factors was tradi-
tionally employed.
Invariably, earnings were a second value component of major
importance to the block rule. Here, generally accepted accounting
principles seemed more important, or at least the courts appeared
II. Jacques Cue & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244
(1950).
12. Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (1965).
Generally accepted accounting principles usually permit deductions for obsolescence as well
as depreciation; permit the listing of construction in progress on the balance sheet; and,
though the leasehold may or may not appear as an asset, allow the listing of leasehold
improvements. W. MEIGS, C. JOHNSON & R. MEIGS, ACCOUNTING, THE BASIS FOR Busi-
NESS DECISIONs 405, 442 (4th ed. 1977).
13. Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 406, 158 A.2d 797 (1960). Gener-
ally accepted accounting principles still generally eschew "write-ups" and favor historical
costs. T. FIFLIs. H. KRIPKE & P. FOSTER, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 79-80 (3d
ed. 1984). The courts seemed to have devised their own approaches to adjustments without
systematic reference to financial practices of analysis.
14. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
15. See Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (1960),
where the court said it was improper to use one value factor (earnings) to measure another
value factor (assets) and adhered to its reconstruction of net assets as reproduction cost less
depreciation. But see Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d
121 (1956), where the court allowed capitalization of certain corporate rental property at
six percent to determine its asset value. Compare this with Justice Holmes' dictum that the
business worth of property rests upon "the expectation of income from it .... Galveston,
Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 226 (1908).
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less willing to tinker with them. However, this pattern may be on
the verge of a major change in view of the criteria which were
found permissible in UOP.16
The block rule traditionally computed the value of a corpora-
tion by first averaging past years' earnings (often five years of
earnings). This average was then multiplied by an appropriate fig-
ure that would produce the value of a future stream of income
that exactly duplicated the value of the past average of earnings.
Rather unrealistically, this assumed that the past would be dupli-
cated in the future for an indefinite period. Until UOP, Delaware
courts always refused to project actual dollar amounts that were
expected to be earned in the future based on an estimation of the
future prospects of the company; however, the courts never hesi-
tated to take unadjusted past dollars and project their continua-
tion into perpetuity.
The formula for the present worth of a perpetuity can be stated
as V = E(M), where V = value, E = earnings and M = an
appropriate factor (or multiplier) that expresses the extent to
which the value or a going concern should exceed its earnings. For
example, an investment that generates $1 in earnings and which is
worth ten times that amount should be valued at, and hence sell
for ten times $1, or $10. This is the so-called price-earnings ratio
known to the equity investor and by which the relation of earnings
to price of a share is expressed to aid in determining the appropri-
ateness of the share price currently demanded by the market. For
example, a share selling at twenty times earnings may be more
"expensive" than one selling at twenty-five times earnings regard-
less of the dollar amounts. It also is another way of stating that if
one earns $1 per year on a $10 investment, the return amounts to
10% per year. A feature of the foregoing is its failure to address
the matter of time and its implicit assumption that the current
relationship between price and earnings will continue indefinitely.
Thus far, the two block rule cornerstones had been a net asset
value, which is an accountant's book value per share rewritten to
please the court, and an earnings value, which is a court-derived
average of accounting earnings for recent years multiplied by an
appropriate factor pursuant to the formula V = E(M). The two
values were combined by use of a weighted average, for example,
60%-40%, 80%-20%, etc., as the court found to be fair under the
16. Even earnings calculated according to generally accepted accounting principles
may imply an objectivity that is illusory. For example, the choice between "LIFO" and
"FIFO" inventory pricing methods may dramatically affect the level of reported earnings,
yet in both instances the method chosen need not always match the order of the outflow of
the physical inventory. J. Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 308-13 (1980).
1987]
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circumstances of each case, to produce the earnings' multiplier.
Of course, a field day for the advocates and their experts is inher-
ent in such a rule as it invites endless debate about selecting the
appropriate weights to ascribe to the variables.
Less light than heat had been generated in early block cases by
intractable judicial adherence to the so-called Dewing tables17
through which an early and celebrated financial writer cautioned
against using multiples in excess of ten. Earlier cases, for exam-
ple, used multipliers of seven or eight"' and six to eight.19 A
breakthrough occurred in 1965 when the court allowed a factor of
fourteen. 0 The court there found compelling the fact that the
company was holding certain assets for later sale which had de-
pressed earnings of recent years such that earnings were consid-
ered unrepresentative of the company's worth. In subsequent
years, the rigid adherence to the Dewing maximum seems to have
disappeared. For example, in another case, the court found no dif-
ficulty with the use of a multiplier of 16.1 possibly because of the
higher price-earnings ratios that had come to be known in the
market by that time.22
Two other valuation elements also figured into the block rule:
dividends and price. Thus, as many as four variables had to be
factored in to reach a weighted average of values. However, espe-
cially in closely held firms, there may be no dividends and price
may either be suspect or may arise with insufficient regularity to
warrant its use. Even for publicly held and traded shares, market
price is a suspect element. The market may be too thin or be sub-ject to external influences which deflect price below intrinsic value
and, in the case of squeeze-outs, the controlling parties may be
taking advantage of circumstances which have not yet been assim-
17. I A. DEWING. THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 390-91 (5th ed. 1953).
18. Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 36 Del. Ch. 169, 128 A.2d 225 (1956).
19. Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956).
Another case rejected a multiplier of 15.2 and relied instead on the figure resulting from
ten times earnings, specifically noting the ceiling in the Dewing table. Application of Dela-
ware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 416, 213 A.2d 203, 213 (1965).
20. Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 215 A.2d 242 (1965).
21. The court apparently was not satisfied that an average of past earnings would
adequately represent future expectations. Rather than predict the future through estima-
tion, the court chose to continue to rely on historical experience and calculate the expected
value of the company by increasing the Dewing Multiplier above its limits.
22. Francis 1. DuPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch.
1973) affid, 334 A.2d 216 (1975). Though use of the Dewing tables may have declined in
recent years, reliance on them can be found in Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Board of Gove-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 165 (1984); Board of Trade of Chicago v.
SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1156 (7th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, May 27, 1982; Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Chase Manhatten Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Eiberger v.
Sony Corp. of America, 459 F. Supp. 1276, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) affid 622 F.2d 1068
(1980).
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ilated into the public price.2" Thus, quite often, the four part block
rule dwindled to three or to two components, with earnings and
assets as the ever-present variables.2 4 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., in-
volving a two step freeze-out, provided the Delaware court with
the opportunity to abandon one substantive rule, to insist on "fair"
procedures which protect minority shareholders and to relax the
mechanical rigidities of the block rule.
II. THE CASE
In the early 1970's, Signal Companies, Inc., a diversified, tech-
nically based operating company, had accumulated surplus cash
from the sale of a subsidiary. In 1974, it approached the manage-
ment of UOP, Inc., a diversified industrial company whose stock
was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and arranged to ac-
quire control of UOP by buying 1,500,000 shares of unissued
UOP stock and making a public tender offer at $21 a share for
the necessary balance. Although the tender offer was greatly over-
subscribed, Signal took only enough to attain 50.5% control of
UOP. Signal initially elected six members of the UOP board of
directors, but when UOP's president retired in 1975, he was re-
placed by a Signal senior executive who also became a member of
the boards of both companies.
In 1977, Signal was still looking for investment opportunities.
Since UOP again seemed the most attractive option, management
determined that UOP would be a good investment at any price up
to $24 a share. Signal's board of directors decided to acquire all of
UOP's shares by way of a cash-out merger at between $20 and
$21 a share. When informed of the plan and price, UOP's presi-
dent could find no objection, but did express concern about the
possible departure of key shop personnel and the need to protect
key employees' stock options.
On February 28, 1978, Signal's management was authorized by
its executive committee to negotiate with UOP about a merger so
that the Signal board could consider the matter at its March 6
meeting. Lehman Brothers, which had acted as investment banker
to UOP for many years and had one of its partners on the UOP
board, was retained to render a fairness opinion as to the price
offered for the minority stock. After doing a quick study, Lehman
Brothers advised both boards on Monday, March 6, that $21
would be a fair price for UOP shares.
23. See Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting
Shareholder's Right of Appraisal, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 1023 (1976).
24. See table of selected Delaware cases in Comment, supra note 10, at 1469.
1987]
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Signal's board unanimously voted to proceed with the merger at
that price. After being provided incomplete information about the
proposition, the UOP outside board members, that is, those who
were not Signal nominees, also approved the proposed merger.
Signal first informed shareholders of UOP of its action on
March 7. Finally, on May 26 at the UOP annual shareholders
meeting, the merger was approved by 51.9% of the total minority
shares outstanding. Counting Signal's shares, the proposal passed
with a 76.2% majority. Only 2.2% of the shares voted against the
merger. By the terms of the agreement, the merger took place on
May 26, and each share of UOP stock in the hands of minority
shareholders automatically converted into a right to receive $21
cash.
In a class action brought on behalf of the minority shareholders,
the plaintiff attacked the validity of the merger, seeking to set it
aside or asking for damages in the alternative. The plaintiff con-
tended that Signal unfairly used its majority status to cash out the
minority at an unfair price and for no proper business purpose,
but rather only to rid itself of the minority. The plaintiff also
claimed that Signal used its majority control of the UOP board
and management to disseminate false and incomplete information
about the transaction. The plaintiff further asserted that the UOP
board breached its fiduciary duty by failing to require an indepen-
dent appraisal of the UOP shares before agreeing to the merger
terms. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that in reaching the cash-out
price per share, the board failed to take into account the value of
substantial assets owned by UOP.25
At the trial, the chancellor found that there was a proper busi-
ness purpose for the merger between UOP and Signal, citing the
advantages which the UOP "investment" would have for Signal. 26
He also found there had been no misrepresentation or improper
failure to disclose relevant information to the minority. Thus, he
ruled that there had been no breach of a fiduciary duty.
Finally, the chancellor concluded that it had not been shown
that the $21 buy-out price was inadequate. In reaching this con-
clusion, he analyzed the testimony of the valuation expert called
by the plaintiff. After first expressing doubts about the persuasive-
ness of the expert's discounted cash flow analysis, the chancellor
ruled that giving consideration to that sort of evidence about value
was not permitted under the Delaware block rule. Block rule testi-
mony had been presented by the defendants' experts to justify the
$21 price. The chancellor noted that fairness to the minority did
25. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1341-42 (Del. Ch. 1981).
26. Id. at 1348-50.
[Vol. 23
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not require that the majority disclose the highest price it was will-
ing to pay for the shares."
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the chancellor's decision
and ruled that the merger had been conducted unfairly because
the information that Signal furnished to the outside directors and
the shareholders was incomplete in material ways.28 The court
further found that public representations made about the merger
and the way it was accomplished were misleading. The court
abandoned its recently adopted requirement that minority
squeeze-out decisions must be supported by some sort of business
purpose,2 9 preferring a requirement that a cash-out be conducted
with "entire fairness" to the minority.30 According to the court,
entire fairness requires that a fair procedure be used to accom-
plish the squeeze-out and that the price offered to the departing
shareholders be a fair one.
The court first found that Signal had not used fair procedures
in taking over UOP. In addressing the latter requirement, the
court claimed that it was merely applying a rule which had long
been on the books. However, it adopted an approach which per-
mitted more flexibility in ascertaining the value of shares. In do-
ing this, the court did not repeal the long-standing block rule, but
merely expanded the permissible techniques and elements that
may be used in determining value. 1 The court recognized that
certain post-merger elements of value could be considered.32 Con-
sequently, it remanded the case for a determination by the chan-
cellor of the fair cash-out price of the UOP shares. 33
III. COMMENTARY OF THE CASE
A. The Business Purpose Doctrine
Before its decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the Delaware
Supreme Court seemingly had been genuinely concerned about
protecting minority interests in a takeover situation. Stung per-
haps by the criticisms of the late professor William Cary and
others,34 the court first attempted to curtail the elimination of mi-
nority interests in a public corporation to those situations in which
27. Id. at 1358-59.
28. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983).
29. Id. at 715.
30. Id. at 711.
31. Id. at 712-13.
32. Id. at 713.
33. Id. at 715.
34. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354 (1978).
19871
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there was a legitimate "business purpose" to be furthered by the
action.35 The court thus approached the problem substantively and
formulated a policy which assumed that a "business interest"
would always outweigh the interests of a minority shareholder
group. Once again, the age-old balancing act between majority
and minority interests had been rung down in favor of the minor-
ity, but this time it was done in a way purported to protect the
minority against arbitrary or capricious freeze-outs. The court
never had much of an opportunity to refine this approach, how-
ever: As was warned by some commentators,36 the rule proved to
be unworkable because the concept of "business purpose" was a
nebulous one at best and became increasingly rarefied in practice.
Perhaps more important to the court, the requirement proved to
be a standing invitation for litigation about the existence and va-
lidity of the "business purpose" in any particular case.3 When it
first adopted the Singer rule of substantive protection, the court
perhaps did not feel any necessity to question its well-established
block rule for valuing shareholder interests, even though it had
attracted criticism. 38 As such, the court saw no reason to explore
alternative valuation methods which might have led to fairer dol-
lar awards.The rejection of the substantive rule of Singer by the
court in UOP brought matters back to the original focus: How
should the legitimate, but conflicting, interests of the two share-
holder groups best be accommodated as a matter of law? UOP
opted first for a procedural rule of full and fair disclosure which is
hardly novel, even for Delaware. The facts of UOP fairly cried for
the application (if not the invention) of such a rule. In its essen-
tials, the court in UOP required that the majority and its manage-
ment must first make full and fair disclosure about the factors it
has taken into account in fixing the value of the securities it seeks
to buy, including the maximum amount it is willing to pay. The
disclosure must be made to any independent faction on the board
and/or to the minority security holders as a class so that some
35. See Roland International Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979) (business
purpose applied to a short form merger); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus. Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
36. The rule survived for only six years. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 34,
for a pungent criticism of the rule. At least while the Singer rule was in effect, it could be
said that minority shareholders had a protected interest in the form of their investment
which, however, was subject to being counterbalanced by an overpowering business interest
of the controllers. Toward the end of the life of the Singer rule, it did not take much of a
business interest to tip the balance in favor of the majority.
37. See Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers, Weinberger
Eclipses Singer, 39 Bus. LAW 1 (1983).
38. See Weiss, supra note 3; Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Parent
Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63 (1978).
[Vol. 23
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sort of informed independent judgement can be exercised about
the proposition. In the end, of course, this rule concerns only the
adequacy of the proposed price.39
Majority controllers of public corporations understandably are
inclined to prefer freezing out minority interests as quickly and
inexpensively as possible. The Delaware court continues to indulge
the first part of this majority preference as a matter of policy.'0
Whether they can do it as inexpensively as before remains to be
seen.
B. The Valuation Rules
The second aspect of UOP, the new valuation rules, reflect a
significant departure from precedent despite the fact that the
court stated that it was merely returning to original principles.'
39. This aspect of the case has attracted an immense amount of analysis and com-
mentary in the law journals. Most of the writers approve of the direction of the case but
seem uncertain about how the disclosure rules are to be implemented. See Berger & AI-
lingham, supra note 37; Deutsch, Weinberger v. UOP: Analysis of a Dissent, 6 CORP. L.
REV. 29 (1983); Herzel & Coiling, Squeeze-Out Mergers in Delaware-The Delaware Su-
preme Court Decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 7 CORP. L. REV. 195 (1984); Herzel &
Coiling, Establishing Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out Mergers After Weinberger v.
UOP, 39 Bus. LAW 1 (1983); Payson & Inskip, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Its Practical
Significance in the Planning and Defense of Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL J. CORP. L. 83
(1983); Prickett & Hanrahan, Weinberger v. UOP: Delaware's Effort to Preserve A Level
Playing Field for Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 59 (1983); Steinberg & Lindahl,
The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 415 (1984); Weiss, The Law of
Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 245
(1983); Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); Note, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Fairness Renewed
In Delaware, 4 J. LAW & COMM. 169 (1984); Note, Corporation Law-Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.: Delaware Reevaluates State-Law Limitations on Take Out Mergers, 62 N.C.L.
REV. 812 (1984); Note, Delaware's Solution to the Problem of the Minority Stockholder
in a Cash-Out Merger-Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. Ch. 1983), 11 N.
Ky. L. REv. 575 (1984); Note, Achieving Fairness in Corporate Cash Mergers: Wein-
berger v. UOP, 16 CONN. L. REV. 95 (1983); Note, The Standard of Care Required of An
Investment Banker to Minority Shareholders in A Cash-Out Merger: Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 8 DEL J. CORP. L. 98 (1983); Note, Price and Purpose: The Two Faces of Fairness in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 13 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 384 (1983); Note, Reappraising Minor-
ity Shareholders Protection in Freezeout Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 58 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 144 (1983); Note, A Cash-Out Breakthrough in Delaware Judicial Merger
Regulation, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 37 Sw. L.J. 823 (1983); Note, Corpora-
tions-Mergers-Delaware Redefines "Entire Fairness" Test for Cash-Out Mergers and
Suggests More Liberal Appraisal Remedy, 28 VILL L. REv. 1049 (1983); Note, Minority
Shareholders & Cash-Out Mergers: The Delaware Court Offers Plaintiffs Greater Protec-
tion and A Procedural Dilemma, 59 WASH. L. REV. 119 (1983); Note, Delaware Corpora-
tion Law: Weinberger v. UOP, lnc.-A Limitation on Singer Fairness Standards?, 42 U.
Pin. L. REV. 915 (1981).
40. The UOP court said that it was returning to Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962), and David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,
281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971), which mandates "a shareholder's recourse to be the basic
remedy of an appraisal." UOP, 457 A.2d at 715.
41. This seemingly basic principle is that "[flair price obviously requires considera-
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This change is now beginning to generate commentary.42 Some of
it merely describes in technical detail the various valuation tech-
niques that might be used by professional financial analysts and
which UOP now makes available to augment the old block rule
considerations.4 a Other commentators have tried to distill a gen-
eral rule from the case. The author of one thoughtful article reads
the case as assuring that the minority shareholder will receive a
price equivalent to, but no more than, an amount that which
would be produced by an arm's length negotiation."'
Arm's length seems consistent with one of the underlying as-
sumptions of financial analysts. They are accustomed to providing
valuation assistance and advice to potentially willing buyers or
sellers whom, they presume, have the freedom to close a deal with
an equally free counterpart or to walk away from it. If the Dela-
ware court views the minority squeeze-out situation based on this
assumption, it will be dealing in fiction. In the economic power
politics of a public corporation, equal bargaining capacity cannot
be mustered by the minority, no matter how full and fair the in-
formation it receives. Legally or politically, it will never be in an
effective position to walk away from an offer and avoid the buy-
out altogether. The only thing the minority can "bargain" about is
the price of its ultimate departure. Individually or collectively, it
is in no position to effectively protect its interests within the avail-
able time frame. The minority has no legitimate agency to look
after its interests. The corporate electoral process does not provide
an adequate forum in which the minority can exercise the judg-
ments that must be made or in which it can mediate the conflicts
that will naturally exist among its members. Any analysis which is
based on the assumption of minority free bargaining really is not a
satisfactory way to value the property interests at stake or even to
find the outer limits of those values.45
tion of all relevant factors involving the value of a company." UOP, 457 A.2d at 713. In
support of this proposition, the court cited the old case of Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye,
31 Del. Ch. 101, 66 A.2d 910 (1949) rev'd, 74 A.2d 71 (1950).
42. See Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 Mo. L. REV. 517 (1984);
Comment, Valuation in the Context of Share Appraisal, 34 EMORY L. 117 (1985); Note,
"Fair Value" Determinations in Corporate "Freeze-Outs" and in Security and Exchange
Act Suits: Weinberger. Other, and Better Methods, 19 VAL U.L. REV. 985 (1985).
43. See Comment, supra note 42.
44. See Booth, supra note 42.
45. Individually or collectively, the minority shareholders stand in a much different
position than does the typical client of a financial expert. The expert can advise his typical
client about the value of a particular share at a particular time, knowing the client's objec-
tives and his ability to cope with the risks involved. To allow an ad hoc minority splinter
group composed of neutral members of a board of directors to make critical decisions on
behalf of the minority is not an adequate substitute. The splinter group has no recognized
legal status to do such things and the individuals are not necessarily selected for expertise
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1. The UOP Financial Expert's Approach
Under the UOP cash-out criteria, the court now allows use of a
"discounted cash flow" approach, presumably representative of a
criterion that might be applied in the investment world.46 In ex-
amining the UOP expert's version of the "cash flow" method, it
should be remembered that it is but one of several criteria that
may exist and that its sole preoccupation with cash may or may
not coincide with other investment analysts' overall methods of as-
signing value to a company.
UOP's expert began by selecting a base year and starting with
the historical accounting data for that year. As is typical of "cash
flow" approaches, the analyst attempted to some extent to undo
the work of the accountant. The accrual accountant prefers to
convert incoming and outgoing cash into accounting "earnings"
that are considered as more truly representative of the financial
condition of the company. For example, earnings may be affected
dramatically by showing the write-off of the cash purchase of a
plant not in the first year of its life, but rather by spreading the
price evenly over the large number of future years during which
the plant will be used. On the other hand, the cash flow analysis
prefers to take these equal and annual deductions for the "depre-
ciation" of the plant and lump them back together in the year or
years of the original cash purchase.
Without judging the propriety of what he did, UOP's expert
selected two accounting items (depreciation and deferred taxes),
labeled them Sources of Cash and added them back to UOP's
1977 income. His selection criteria for the two are not explained
in the reported case, but a fair assumption is that the items in
part represented relatively large sums that involved the outflow of
cash in some year or years other than 1977. These so-called cash
flows from operations were probably but a few of many items that
did not involve a 1977 cash disbursement but that may, neverthe-
less, have provoked a 1977 accounting deduction.47 Thus, the
question arises as to how many additional adjustments of this sort
might be made to convert the accountant's figures to a true and
complete cash inflow. The UOP decision offers little help on this
point.
in their particular field.
46. Some authors have gone so far as to state that "[d]ifferent users will be inter-
ested in different values, but security analysts will want to value the firm at the present
value of future cash flows." Page & Hooper, Financial Statements for Security Analysts,
35 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 50, 55 (1979).
47. Such deductions might have also included amortization and deferred
compensation.
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UOP's expert turned next to cash outflows, or uses of cash and
selected two large ones: long-term debt payments and additions of
plant and equipment. These two items differ somewhat from the
cash sources discussed above not only because of the direction of
the flow of cash (one pair in and the other pair out), but also
because the two are found in different parts of the company's fi-
nancial statements. For example, cash spent for plant and equip-
ment directly influences the assets (cash and plant) found in the
balance sheet while payments on the long term debt affect an as-
set (cash) and a liability (debt), both of which are found in the
balance sheet. On the other hand, depreciation and deferred taxes
constitute non-cash expenses and reduce earnings in the income
statement for the year in question."'
Cash analysis is not concerned with annual "earnings" in the
accounting sense which was the starting point for the Delaware
courts in block cases. Instead, UOP's expert began by construct-
ing the amount of "cash" that would be needed by the company
during a business year. Having found the major cash sources for
1977 and the major cash uses for 1977, the analyst subtracted the
latter from the former to reveal an excess of cash that presumably
could have been removed without impairing operations for the
year.4 Other cash items of an extraordinary nature and certain
excess liquidity were found, but their full role in the process pre-
sumably would require resort to the full report of the expert. For
reasons not fully explained in the reported case, once he located
the excess or "free" cash for 1977, the expert selected two capital-
ization rates. He divided the excess cash by each rate to determine
present values, then added the aforementioned extraordinary
items and excess liquidity and divided this sum by the number of
outstanding shares which produced a range of values. This part of
the process obviously cries out for further explanation than that
afforded in the chancery court's opinion.
UOP's expert did not stop with 1977 for which he had historical
data on which to rely, but proceeded specifically to project cash
flow figures for 1978 through 1982. The result was a dollar
amount that constituted the present value of the company which
furnished a per share figure for the value fairness test. By endors-
ing this approach, the Delaware court approved projecting value
48. Not all financial analysts would necessarily follow this approach. Some, perhaps,
might limit cash adjustments to those that affect merely the earnings figure listed on the
income statement.
49. One author describes cash flow as "the difference between inflows and outflows.
More specifically, the cash flow from a firm is its earnings less investments necessary to
maintain the firm . J. FRANCIS, INVESTMENTS: ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 282 (3d
ed. 1980).
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on the basis of future contingencies and thereby departed from the
block approach. The court did impose a precautionary outer limit
for projections by excluding those of a "speculative" variety.50 It
remains for future litigation to refine this speculative concept.
a. Source and Use of Funds Statement. The outline of the ex-
pert's analysis is based on what accountants usually call a Source
and Use of Funds Statement, or a Statement of Changes in Fi-
nancial Position, or a similarly named statement, that generally
appears as a part of a corporate annual report. 1 Recognizing that
the accrual based balance sheet and income statement may reflect
little about the actual inflow and outflow of cash during any pe-
riod, a source and use of funds statement provides supplementary
information by partially converting the accounting figures back to
cash figures. For example, a list of "sources of funds" or "sources
of cash" might also include cash collected for the year's credit
sales. Such sources of cash might include "deferred salaries" and
"deferred taxes" and many other items that, although listed as
accounting expenditures, did not require the use of cash in the
year in question. Conversely, sources of cash might also be ex-
panded to include items that did not affect the accounting income
for the year in question but most certainly did affect the contents
of the corporate till. Examples of this are funds raised by both
short and long term borrowing, funds raised by new stock issues
and funds raised by sales of fixed assets.
By the same token, "uses of funds" or "uses of cash" may be
shown by adjusting the financial statement to reveal some of the
many items that require cash outlays which accrual accounting
might properly omit as expenses in the income statement and/or
changes in the balance sheet, including expenditures on a new
plant, dividends paid and payments on debt. The difficulty is that
there are so many such items that to pursue all of them would be
50. UOP, 457 A.2d at 713.
51. For a thorough discussion of the mechanics of the source and use of funds ap-
proach, see D. LIPSKY & D. LIPTON, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS
153-71 (1985). For further discussion of the method and adjustments as well as illustra-
tions of its use in practice (at least in determining creditworthiness), see the latest version
of Robert Morris Associates Uniform Credit Analysis manual and an example of source
and use of fund statements in 1985 West Point-Pepperell, Inc. Ann. Rep. 21. The general
task of transforming a source and use of funds statement into a valuation device is formi-
dable. For example, the sources and uses to be omitted must be determined, for even in
these days of sophisticated data processing equipment, to include them all could become
unwieldy and the estimation period still must be selected. Estimating in perpetuity im-
peaches itself, although estimation for much more than six months or so is hardly error-
free. Yet questions still arise: Might managerial data affect the expert's projection? Might
the use of end-of-year estimates rather than during the year (each day, each week) be
legitimized on the ground that the latter are too speculative? For a discussion of manage-
ment as a source of information, see Page & Hooper, supra note 46, at 50.
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a ponderous task. Another problem is that the source and use of
funds statement really is a one year picture, reliance on which
again raises the question of what will happen in the future. For
example, shall an indefinite continuation of the past be assumed or
shall one actually project or estimate these many transactions as
they are reasonably expected to occur in year two, year three,
year twenty-three, or any other year?
Delaware courts have always recognized the time value of
money as have investors. Thus, a dollar today is worth more than
a dollar ten years from now, even ignoring inflation, and the bor-
rower well knows that interest is the charge required by the lender
to compensate for this time differential. In any analysis such as
discounted cash flow, time must be addressed. The future values
must be projected to obtain the proper estimate for each year and
then the entire stream of cash must be discounted back to the
present at some rate to obtain its present value. This is quite an
undertaking, not only because of the invariably subjective task of
selecting capitalization rates, but also because of the high level of
inaccuracy inherent in projecting the precise time of cash flow.
For example, it does make a difference to an employee whether
his salary is received at the end of the present calendar year or
monthly throughout the same calendar year. Thus, theoretically,
one should project not merely the year during which a new plant
will be paid for, or the year during which a new common issue
will be sold, or the year during which salaries will be paid, but
rather the precise day within the year. Further, this should be true
not only for the projections for next year, but for the tenth, the
twentieth, the thirtieth year. Is it important to do so? In theory,
yes. Is it necessary? No, because distant errors may be masked by
using high capitalization rates thus producing a lower present
value for the distant guess. Is the concept of any worth? Yes, just
as the nonexistent perfect circle, it stands as a theoretical refer-
ence against which actual practice can be refined. The investment
analyst's search for "value" is futile, of course, should absolute
accuracy be a requirement; but imprecision is no cure.
For the above reasons, a source and use of funds statement usu-
ally explains but one year in a corporate life. Yet, a "discounted
cash flow model," however truncated, must always expand the one
year into a more acceptable future period unless corporate liqui-
dation is imminent. Purely in the interests of expediency, the pro-
cess must always omit certain of the myriad of less significant
cash items.
UOP's expert seemed to have based his model on an extension
of the source and use of funds approach. He also appeared to have
used six years, to have applied and discounted three "sources" and
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two "uses" and to have relied on "end of year" figures, all of
which the court did not dispute.
2. Problems With Generally Accepted Financial Criteria
In its opinion remanding the case, the Delaware Supreme Court
indicated that the chancellor should not have rejected the UOP
expert's cash flow evidence of the valuation of the shares since
"the standard 'Delaware block' or weighted average method...
shall no longer exclusively control such proceedings. We believe
that a more liberal approach must include any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the finan-
cial community ...."52
The court's search for generally accepted valuation standards
seems to result from analogous reliance on generally accepted ac-
counting principles in financial reporting cases. While the search
for such principles itself is not always easy, the potential applica-
bility of competing rules to a given situation can be a most frus-
trating, if not impossible, task.53 It would seem that at this stage
of the development of the financial art, a search for and the appli-
cation of generally accepted financial criteria might be almost im-
possible to accomplish since the number of such maxims vary di-
rectly with the number of available financial experts.
It is not clear how widely the specific approach of UOP's expert
is used in financial practice. It is minimally discussed in the finan-
cial literature. The Delaware court will ultimately have to deter-
mine whether its new rule will have the effect of allowing any and
all financial experts to bring in various and sundry approaches
"for what they are worth" or if the profession itself will have to
devise authoritative principles applicable to common valuation
situations.
52. UOP, 457 A.2d at 712-13.
53. Exegesis of generally accepted accounting principles can bewildering: The cost
principle, in which assets are written down but not up, is based on the consistency princi-
ple, which might be thought to conflict with the cost principle. But, consistency apparently
has a temporal connotation and urges that the same practice generally be followed each
year. Opponents of the cost principle might suggest that the consistency principle requires
that one do the wrong thing on a regular basis. The objectivity principle bases accounting
on exchange transactions and guards against subjectivity. That is, the cost of a building
should be its original price and not an estimate of the cost of its replacement. Yet the
matching principle, by which an asset's expenses should be matched with its revenues in
the same period in which the latter are earned, opens the door to choices. Among deprecia-
tion methods, the subjectivity inherent in selecting the depreciation method to be used can,
depending on the method, cause earnings to be higher (straight-line depreciation) or lower
(accelerated depreciation). For an extended discussion of this topic, see J. Cox, supra note
16, at 63-70.
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3. The Dividend Valuation Model
Another form of the discounted cash flow process apparently in
use in the investment world is the so-called Dividend Valuation
Model, often referred to as the Gordon Model.54 If the UOP opin-
ion is read literally, this theory might be permitted in valuing a
corporation. A key difference between an expert using the divi-
dend model and the approach of UOP's expert is the perspective
of each. The UOP-type expert generally takes an insider's view of
the corporation and, in one form or another, nets corporate cash
outflows which might include "dividends" as but one of the many
corporate cash outflows. Conversely, the dividend valuation model
expert takes the shareholder's view of the corporation and consid-
ers the present value of only the outflowing dividends discounted
at an appropriate capitalization rate.
The dividend model has been discussed extensively by many au-
thors;15 however, a brief review is helpful to contrast this theory
with the approach of UOP's expert. In its search for new criteria
and in its opening of the door to those generally used in financial
practice, Delaware courts must understand that the two ap-
proaches to discounted cash flow are quite different and that
knowledge of their mechanics is essential to their appropriate
application.
The dividend model may be represented as P = D1/(k-g) where
P = the present value of the common shares, D1 = the dividend
expected to be paid in the first year, k = the appropriate rate of
capitalization at which all future dividends expected from the
share can be reduced to a single present value, and g = the con-
54.
Discounting the future stream of cash flows to shareholders is the most widely
accepted method of stock valuation. The cash flows consist of dividends plus the
proceeds from sale of the stock. The selling price, however, reflects the next
buyer's expectations ... about future dividends. Thus, the value of a share reflects
projected dividends to current and all future shareholders.
Rappaport, The Affordable Dividend Approach to Equity Valuation, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
52 (1986). Though M.J. Gordon and later writers have made overwhelming contributions
toward its development and refinement, J.B. Williams, an early financial writer, also did
much toward synthesizing and adding to even earlier proponents of the cash model. See J.
FRANCIS, supra note 49, at 265. See generally M. GORDON, THE INVESTMENT, FINANCING
AND VALUATION OF THE CORPORATION (1962); J. WILLIAMS, THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT
VALUE (1938).
55. See R. KOLE, INVESTMENTS 244-63 (1986); J. COHEN, E. ZINBARG & A. ZEIKEL.
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 384-400 (4th ed. 1982); Hawkins,
Toward an Old Theory of Equity Valuation, 33 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 48-49 (1977); Com-
ment, supra note 42, at 127-33. One author notes that the "most commonly used approach
to valuing common stock is to find the present value of expected future dividends." R.
RADCLIFFE. INVESTMENT: CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 287 (1982). Another states
that the dividend model has become "standard fare" for most segments of the investments
industry. Rappaport, supra note 54, at 52.
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stant growth rate at which future annual dividends can be ex-
pected to increase." The classic assumptions of the model are that
dividends will be paid in perpetuity, that dividends alone give
value to a stock, from which it follows that a stock that will pay
no dividends can never acquire a value, and that dividends will
grow at a constant rate. (Alternative growth assumptions can be
applied, such as different growth rates for different periods, which
can be a formidable job indeed.57 )
Some critics are troubled by the notion that dividend payments
make up the only value element of a share. (To some degree, a
similar criticism may be leveled at the preoccupation of UOP's
expert with net incoming cash as a single fountainhead of value.)
This assumption states that one who buys a stock does so only for
the cash to be paid him while owner and that this cash invariably
takes the form of a dividend. Further, if a stockholder decides to
sell, the buyer will be of a similar mind and pay for a stream of
perpetual dividends. Should this second stockholder decide to sell,
the third buyer will pay for dividends in perpetuity and so on. The
result of the assumption is that the discounted present values of an
endless series of finite streams when added together will be the
same as the present value of an infinite stream. Thus, forever is
forever, whether expressed as a perpetuity or as a series of finite
periods added together in perpetuity. 8
Whether or not the assumptions of the dividend model are
proper, similar to the model of UOP's expert, the theory does deal
with cash, does involve projecting and discounting and is said to
be in common use in institutional investment decision making.59
However, one model deals with cash flowing out to the stockholder
while the other deals with cash flowing into the company. The use
by UOP's expert of a shortened version of the latter and the
court's approval of it seem to reflect a preference. Irrespective of
the discounted cash flow model that Delaware courts may finally
adopt or integrate into their valuation criteria, it is imperative
that the major differences between the model of UOP's expert and
the dividend model be known, for the two models take signifi-
cantly different positions in their calculations of "cash."
56. Brudney, supra note 38, at 74-75; FRANCIS, supra note 49, at 265-68.
57. R. KOLB, supra note 55, at 249-53.
58. See H. PHILLIPS & J. RITCHIE JR., INVESTMENT ANALYSIS & PORTFOLIO SELEC-
TION 150-53, 154-56, 157-60 (2d ed. 1983).
59. R. RADCLIFFE, supra note 55, at 287; Rappaport, supra note 54, at 52.
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4. Other Valuation Approaches
At best, the valuation process, whether applied to an individual
stock or the whole enterprise, is a semi-sophisticated, demi-profes-
sional guessing game. In the investment world, toward which Del-
aware courts are seeming now to turn, the best valuation approach
is the one that works. Yet this can only be known in retrospect. To
expect more from financial analysis is to expect too much. Though
a book on how to become rich in the market may sell well, it
likely will not deliver on its implied promise, for the ultimate key
to investment success would sell, if at all, for a price well beyond
affordability.
Fundamental analysis"0 has many forms, all of which hold that
a stock may have underlying value that differs from its price at
any particular time. This notion permeates the investment com-
munity and seems to have its uses in legal valuation in quests for
"fair" value, going concern value and the like. The block ap-
proach essentially was a method by which to measure underlying
stock value, irrespective of its price. Not surprisingly, the various
discounted cash flow models are but extensions of the approach of
the fundamentalist.
Thus, the fundamentalist will presuppose that price and value
may be unequal and that as a result, some shares are overvalued
and others are undervalued. In fact, though financial modernists
may argue that the price of a stock is equal to its value, the die-
hard fundamentalist may argue that price can never equal value.
That is, the underlying value as stated in terms of the present
worth of all future expectations from the stock must be thought
by the buyer to be higher than the stock's price and that underly-
ing value must be thought by the seller to be lower than the price,
or there would never be a motive to buy or sell. If all participants
in a market thought that they were merely swapping dollars or
shares of equal value, the exchange would be without gain or loss
and, absent nontraditional financial motives, there would be no
sale.
The problem is that fundamentalist buyers and sellers differ on
their opinions as to value and as to the methods by which their
opinions should be formulated. Buyers and sellers may use the
60. "All investors need not agree about the proper value of a security. Forecasts of
future propects will differ between investors when they hold different information about the
security." R. RADCLIFFE, supra note 55, at 282. Some celebrated fundamentalists seemed
to emphasize asset value and minimize the algebra. See. e.g., Graham, The Future of
Common Stocks, 30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 20 (1974). Other writers devote much space to
economic and industry analysis as well as financial statement (including ratio analysis)
examination. H. PHILLIPS & J. RITCHIE JR., supra note 58, at 422-513.
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dividend model and still arrive at different values for the stock
merely by using different capitalization rates. These capitalization
rates might result from differences in the degree of risk each is
willing to undertake or differences as to the degree of risk that
each perceives to be inherent in the shares. Many fundamentalists,
however, may eschew the dividend model and base their decision
on a host of characteristics, arranged according to their individual
preferences for value factors chosen from among the myriad avail-
able to them. Such factors may include book value, earning per
share, operating expense ratios, corporate liquidity or ratios of
debt to equity. Analysts who have done this over time and with
success may be less than willing to share their secrets. Thus, in
selecting from methods used in the investment world, Delaware
courts must realize that the choices are infinite.
In contrast, the so-called technical analysts61 purport to have no
interest in stock value but are concerned only with price direction.
For example, the technicians read patterns in the rising and fall-
ing of stock prices and rely on the predictive nature that they feel
these price patterns may contain. Thus, if a pattern indicates an
expected price rise, the stock may become a buy candidate. The
technicians seem to follow a minority approach and come regu-
larly under fire for those who adhere to the efficient market hy-
pothesis. 62 Depending on the degrees to which its followers claim
that it exists, this theory adheres to the belief that the market
price is generally equal to value because all relevant information
affecting price is instantaneously incorporated in it; a less severe
viewpoint is that information is assimilated in the market price
with sufficient rapidity that the fundamentalists will be unable to
make their decisions in time sufficient to produce a success record
that is higher than merely buying the stock at its market
price.63Thus far, Delaware courts appear to have emphasized a
form of fundamental approach and seem to be willing to add to it.
In doing so, a caveat is necessary: Reliance on the lore of the tech-
nicians and of the theoreticians who dwell in the world of the effi-
cient market hypothesis could well produce an irrelevant complex-
ity and merely increase the difficulty of formulating new Delaware
61. J. COHEN, E. ZINBARG & A. ZEIKEL, supra note 55, at 294-335.
62. B. BRANCH, INVESTMENTS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 332 (1985).
63. Some "suggest that earnings per share follow a random walk.... What it simply
means is that generally a security analyst will not significantly improve his ability to fore-
cast ... by studying historical earnings." J. FRANCIS, supra note 49, at 340. Though the
buzz words "random walk" appear to have merged somewhat into "efficient market," virtu-
ally all analysts seem to attribute at least some level of efficiency to the stock market and
its ability to include information about the stock in its price with at least some degree of
speed. B. BRANCH, supra note 62, at 138, 141. For a clear and readable treatment of this
theory, see B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (4th ed. 1985).
1987]
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 23 [1986], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss2/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
cash-out standards.
C. The Arm's Length Model for Valuation
A footnote in the UOP case makes reference to arm's length
bargaining;64 yet arm's length bargaining may also be relevant to
value as argued by one commentator .6 He hypothesized that the
outer limits of the bargain should be fixed at the greatest price
which the majority would be willing to pay. The lower theoretical
limit presumably would be the price below which the minority
would be unwilling to sell. The "fair value" of the shares should
lie somewhere in between these figures and the "modern valuation
methods" now permitted by UOP could be applied to extrapolate
that value."'
There seem to be two fallacies in this approach. First, this ap-
proach still does not come to grips with the problem of identifying
the minimum elements of value inherent in the minority shares
which the court as a matter of policy should protect. Second, the
upper limit is at best an artificial one that plays into the hands of
the majority which already has most, if not all, of the advantages.
From its perspective, the UOP majority in searching for a "good
investment" had determined what rate of return it must have,
what costs and risks it would accept and its other requirements. It
then looked for an investment that satisfied these expectations. It
valued the benefits it expected to derive from that investment and
calculated the highest price it could pay and still make a profit
given its investment assumptions.
In a true arm's length model, there is nothing to guarantee that
either party to the negotiation will be able to realize its expecta-
tions. Certainly, the Delaware court could not have intended that
the upper investment value of the UOP stock as determined by
the management of Signal, which had to act as a fiduciary, be
used in such a way that it would also fix the upper level of ap-
praisal value which the minority should receive. Because Signal
owed a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders, the court in-
sisted that all value information be disclosed to be used by the
minority in exercising its judgement whether to accept or reject
the "deal." The minority should be able to compare that price
with an even higher price if available and then reject the major-
ity's "offer" if it wishes. The disclosure of one bargainer's top
price to the other one is of itself inconsistent with the arm's length
64. UOP, 457 A.2d at 709.
65. Booth, supra note 42, at 542-57.
66. Id. at 527-31, 535-36.
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hypothesis which puts a premium on secrecy. In any event, the
attempt to construct a specific value of shares by use of the arm's
length model is chimerical. It cannot produce dollar and cents re-
suits since the bargain price which truly free negotiators would
have agreed on can never be artificially constructed. Indeed, an
artificially created value relies on the unwarranted assumption
that the parties would have arrived at a mutually agreed price.
The power dynamics permitted under Delaware merger law as-
sures the majority that a "deal" will be struck-the stock will be
sold, but the price will have to be ascertained some other way
than by an artificial bargaining construct.
The arm's length ideal has a certain logical or rhetorical appeal,
but it proves useless as a practical way for ascertaining value. In
the context of UOP, it is simply a rationalization for allowing the
minority shareholder to have some sort of final say in the matter.
The minority shareholder is being forced out of the corporation at
the behest of the powerful and better informed management
which has chosen the time and manner of the exchange and over
which the minority shareholder has no control and little option.
Even though the shareholder is given an opportunity to vote on the
matter, the opportunity for ever exercising an "informed" judge-
ment about the "fairness" of the offering price in minimal at best.
All this reflects the fact that the displaced shareholder is not re-
ally in an "arm's length" situation, but really is in the midst of an
unfriendly power play by which the stronger majority can legally
use its control to force the minority to make a choice between
taking what at first blush may seem to be an attractive price for
its shares and remaining as a vulnerable minority.17
Thus, freeze-out transference is clearly different from a truly
voluntary transaction. Therefore, the use of the valuation tech-
niques which investment analysts normally would use in making
judgment about value for trading or investing are not appropriate.
Analysts' techniques are designed to provide the best possible in-
sights about value at any particular moment so that the owner or
potential investor can best decide whether to accept or walk away
from the "opportunity" at hand. In contrast, the minority share-
holder realistically does not have the option to refuse a squeeze-
out, making normal analytical tools inapplicable. Unless a valua-
tion system is adapted to the involuntary nature of the freeze-out
situation which properly values the interests which should be pro-
tected as a matter of policy and unless such a method is sensitive
to the peculiarities of each squeeze-out situation, the valuation
67. See Brudney, supra note 38.
1987]
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 23 [1986], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss2/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
system will be inadequate no matter how well it may perform in
other contexts.
To be useful in the freeze-out context, a valuation system must
satisfy at least three criteria: (1) every interest in the stock having
value should be considered using an appropriate, acceptable
method; (2) in calculating total value, no interest should be
counted more than once; and (3) compensation should be made
for any costs and/or added risk factors which are imposed by the
transaction. 8
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF VALUE
It is much too simplistic to uncritically merge conventional val-
uation models into freeze-out fairness law. Initially, the elements
of value to be protected must be identified. Some of the value ele-
ments of shares of stock that have been identified by the Delaware
court include:
ASSETS
EARNINGS
DIVIDENDS
PRICE
POST-MERGER VALUES
TRANSACTIONAL COSTS 69
But even after the general elements of value have been listed,
the elements that need protection in any given freeze-out situation
still must be specified. If more than one element has been identi-
fied, then the values of multiple elements will have to be assimi-
lated into one single final valuation figure" unless these values are
mutually exclusive and thus can be directly added together.
68. Financial analysts seem committed to the idea that any investment opportunity
can be reduced to an ascertainable dollar figure and that any investment is as good as the
next one if it provides the same investment return. See Booth, supra note 42, at 532 (citing
J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON. THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-98 (1973)).
This approach depends heavily on the "efficient market" which is now seriously questioned
for purposes of determining the real value of shares. See Brudney, supra note 38. This
attitude of fungibility of investment seems to be the underlying rationale of the cash freeze-
out. But even if the value being offered truly represents the intrinsic value of the shares
being given up, the shareholder is faced with the expenses and risk of finding a substitute,
and hopefully equivalent, investment. So, in addition to whatever the "true value" of his
shares, the minority shareholder should be allowed an additional award to cover the trans-
actional expenses and opportunity risks to which he will be exposed. UOP, 457 A.2d at 713.
69. Note, supra note 10. The concept of "post-merger values" was first recognized in
the UOP case where the court also mentioned transactional costs.
70. Note, supra note 10, at 1468-71.
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The blending or weighing of values was perhaps the most dis-
tressing aspect of the old Delaware approach. The court was re-
quired to first identify which of the four elements were to be con-
sidered in a particular case, then identify the predominate ones
and finally weigh them proportionately.7 The court's way of iden-
tifying the elements to be valued had a factual, if pragmatic, ba-
sis, but the weighing process was never satisfactorily explained
and appeared to have been highly subjective.7 2 A master or an
appraiser initially exercised his judgment about the appropriate
weighing, then the chancellor would reweigh the elements and, in
important cases, the Delaware Supreme Court also calculated a
value on appeal, selecting either the figure of the appraiser or of
the chancellor or averaging their difference. 3
The result of all this was very imprecise and was subject to sig-
nificant swings in value depending on which element was given the
most weight. The discounting factor, which was subjective in na-
ture, also had an influencing, levering effect.74 The process
amounted to an exercise of disinterested good faith, but relied on
blind discretion which was founded on an artificially narrow basis
of fact. The Delaware court seems to hope that the new UOP ap-
proach of opening up the process to include additional elements
contributing to value will somehow make it fairer. This may well
be the case, but the process really will not be any easier nor any
more predictable.
In its application of the block rule, the Delaware court has per-
sistently mentioned assets, earning, dividends and price as the per-
tinent elements of value of shares in appraisal situations. More
often than not, the court focused its attention on the first two fac-
tors. As it was in the UOP case, price was often ignored or not
found to be decisive because it was suspect or nonexistent.7 5 Divi-
dends would seem to be only a subset of earnings and, for most
purposes, will not merit separate treatment. With respect to earn-
ings, cash flow analysis can take several forms. The method used
by UOP's expert seemed to account for the earnings value by us-
ing earnings as the focal point of his analysis. He first made ad-justments to transform them to cash earnings, but then continued
71. Seldom, if ever, would other elements be explicitly identified; however, in the
"adjustment" process, other elements would be taken into account.
72. See Brudney, supra note 38.
73. For examples of this process, see Francis I. DuPont & Co. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973); Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42
Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (1965).
74. See Francis I. DuPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del.
Ch. 1975); Schaeffer, The Fallacy of Weighing Asset Value and Earnings Value in Ap-
praisals of Corporate Stock, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1031 (1982).
75. See Brudney, supra note 38.
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with calculations of other cash flows which were not limited to
those which directly affected earnings. Instead, he also included
other cash flows which had broad impacts on the entire financial
structure of the firm.
The assets of a corporation are the physical and intangible
property interests which are owned by the corporate entity and in
which a shareholder would have an ultimate claim."8 In some in-
stances, the full value of the corporation's property can be ascer-
tained by a cash flow analysis, particularly if all those assets are
being directly devoted to the generation of the relevant corporate
cash flow that should be measured. 77 In other instances, some of
the corporation's assets must be valued differently if they are not
presently generating any cash flow to the company. 8
CONCLUSION
The UOP case raises more problems than it settles, but in the
i'ng run its approach should prove beneficial. However, much de-
velopment and refinement remains for the courts. UOP has broken
the rigidities of the old block rule by
1. Permitting the use of modern stock valuation practices;
2. Allowing the use of expert estimations about future financial
prospects of the company (in contrast to the blind projection of
past averaging as done under the block rule);
3. Creating the means for refining the elements of value of shares
while distinguishing the means of actually valuing them;
76. Conventionally, the shareholders' interests in a corporation are described as their
right to exercise their claim to management or control and their right to assets if and when
the corporation is liquidated. In a large national corporation, the average shareholder has
little or no interest in control and, in any event, the opportunities for asserting any effective
control are minuscule. "Control" as an element of value in the minority squeeze-out situa-
tion has also been rejected because realistically the majority has already bought and at-
tained control of the corporation. However, as long as the Delaware courts accept as part
of fair procedure the power of the minority group to reject the proposition or if the courts
will allow the minority's interest to be priced by the disinterested faction of the board, then
the minority arguably has a new or residual "control" value (or "nuisance" value perhaps)
and logically should be taken into account in considering merger plans.
77. The corporation may have assets that are "redundant," that is, those which are
not integrated into the economic operations of the company. These assets may have a po-
tential for generating a cash flow or they may only have a potential for an eventual sale.
Nevertheless, they have a "current value" which must be accounted for to the minority
shareholder who will be permanently separated from this value. The Delaware court has
recognized this particular type of asset (see Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137
(Del. 1980) and Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 793, 93 A.2d 107 (1952)),
but it has never developed a satisfactory way of assimilating that value into the total
package.
78. The value of these kinds of assets can be determined by application of conven-
tional property appraisal methods for similar property. The distinction between operating
and non-operating assets has been recognized for estate and gift purposes.
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4. Explicitly recognizing the legitimacy of crediting future values
connected with the accomplishments or expectations of the
merger;
5. Opening the door to compensation for transactional losses; and
6. Providing the potentiality for eliminating the subjective weigh-
ing of multiple value elements.
However, UOP provides little or no guidance concerning
1. Identifying the relevant elements of value which must be con-
sidered in various circumstances;
2. Identifying the accepted valuation practices that are appropri-
ate for use in various situations and how they should be used or
modified in particular cases;
3. Identifying the relevant economic stream to be measured in va-
rious circumstances and specifying the time length for such
measures;
4. Selecting the appropriate capitalization rate that should be used
in various routines and subroutines; and
5. Identifying the circumstances in which elements of the block
rule should not be used, or used alone or used in conjunction with
other valuation techniques.
The old block rule had the virtue of simplicity. The total range
of elements to be valued was restricted and very often only two
were deemed important in a given case. The process of choosing
the elements to be considered always invited legal debate, but it
also produced judicial principles of ascertaining the relevance and
importance of the short list of elements as these items appeared in
various situations. These principles should continue to be useful
even in the expanded scope of UOP and they may prove helpful in
refining any new elements of value which may appear in the
future.
Emphasis on one or more elements of a corporation's economic
flow has been in fashion at one time or another. Some analysts
have concentrated on the dividend stream, others on the earnings
stream. Still others, like the expert in UOP, have concentrated on
the "cash flow." There is as little agreement among financial pro-
fessionals about the proper definition of any particular stream as
there is about which one or ones will best reflect the corporations's
worth. Post-UOP litigation may produce some guidance about
which are not useful in the squeeze-out situation. Certainly, the
length of any stream to be measured will have to be fixed. Some
arbitrary and simple rule may have to be adopted based on the
facts of that case, such as the average of five years back and/or
five years forward. Information that is much older than five years
may not be relevant to a current valuation effort and any projec-
tion beyond five years is liable to be just a pure guess. An infinite
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projection of the stream clearly is not appropriate. Such an as-
sumption is unrealistic from the perspective of the owner and its
use would tend to produce unjustifiably skewed values. In the final
analysis, the best rule might well be to use the most recent year of
experience and project it for five years as did UOP's expert.
Financial projection under the block rule and modern financial
practice requires a capitalization rate for determining the value of
the stream under consideration. Slight shifts in the rate cause vast
swings in the final value figure. There is probably little that courts
can do themselves to make this selection process a more precise
one. As under the block rule, eventually the courts will have to
temper the professional estimates of the expert witness with their
own common sense.
There is one particular area of the UOP approach which has the
potential to vastly improve the current dilemma faced in valuing a
corporation. Weighing the elements to reach a final value figure
was highly subjective and unprincipled. The introduction of com-
peting modern techniques of value analysis may finally lead the
Delaware law to a formula or series of formulae which would per-
mit identification of the discreet elements of value which could be
combined into a single figure without going through a subjective
weighing process.
Delaware has always shown a preference for earnings and assets
as elements of value. Adhering to the block rule would forego the
new avenues opened by the UOP rule. One way to integrate the
positive attributes of both the block rule method and the UOP
approach would be a valuation system which combines the active
elements of the enterprise, the modern valuation techniques of
UOP, rather than the highly subjective weighing approach, and
any identifiable property not currently contributing to the eco-
nomic stream of the firm valued according to conventional liquida-
tion techniques.
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